Category Archives: Law

Partnership Tax – Depreciation Allocations

Posted on by
Reply

      Before steering away from contribution allocations, there is one big issue and a few minor issues that need to be addressed. We’ll begin with the allocation of deductions.

      When property depreciates, those deductions are allocated in accordance with the partnership agreement. To calculate the effect of the allocations you can use the following methods:

 

  1. Traditional Method
    1. Allocate the book depreciations to each partner.
    2. Allocate tax depreciation to the non-contributing partner to the extent of the book depreciation.
    3. Allocate the rest of the depreciation to the contributing partner.
    4. Summary: If all is done correctly, and no problems arise. At the end of the depreciation period, things should even out.
    5. Traditional Method w/ Curatives
      1. If the ceiling rule is hitting, you can allocate depreciations from other properties.
      2. Remedial Method
        1. Works substantially the same, the difference is that when you allocate depreciations to one partner you allocate gain to the other partner.

      So much for the big issues, now a few minor points in closing:

  • The service wants to prevent the type of loss from shifting, so there are bright line rules for particular types of property.
    • Unrealized Receivables are always ordinary income.
    • Involuntary Items are ordinary for five years once transferred and then become capital items.
    • Capital Loss property is always capital loss. If the property is exchanged in a non-taxable transaction the taint of capital loss transfers as well.

 

      Now if a new partner joins in the middle, you can deal with this in a couple ways. You can update your accounts and make allocations as necessary, or you can allocate more gain to the newcomer until things even out.

      Finally, property with a built-in loss always goes to the contributing partner under 704.

      Hopefully, if you’ve been following and you’re still awake you now have a greater sense of the myriad of tax issues that come on the coattails of partnership allocations.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.

Partnership Tax – Contribution Allocations

Posted on by
Reply

      I apologize in advance. The last time this subject was taken up was a long time ago (at least for me). The network of allocations has led us back to contribution of property. Now when a partner contributes property, he increases the capital accounts by the value of what he has contributed. The partnership than takes the basis of the contributed property.

      This leads to complications when the adjusted basis is different than the FMV. Once the partnership disposes of the property, the gain may be equally allocated, yet this is unfair. If a partner contributes cash they should not recognize gain on the sale of the property. The IRC allows a few methods to avoid this problem: the traditional rule, the traditional rule with curatives, and the remedial method.

      The traditional rule allocates all built-in gain or loss to the contributing partner. So if a property with a basis of 8k was sold for 20k, the 12k gain would go to the contributing partner. If the original basis on contribution was 10k, the partner would get 10k of gain and the remaining 2k would be split. On a good day, this works just fine. Things get hinky if the property is sold for less than its book value, and more than its basis.

      It might make sense in these cases to allocate gain/loss accordingly, but you run into the “ceiling rule.” Under the ceiling rule, you cannot make allocations at the capital level that you don’t make at the tax level. An example: If a property with a basis of 12k and a FMV of 20k was sold at 15k, there would be a tax gain of 3k but a book loss of 5k. The 3k gain could be allocated, but there is no way to compensate for the loss. To solve this problem, we come to the second method, the “curative” allocations.

      Suppose we have the problem highlighted above, but there are other transactions happening at the same time (let’s say that the company has sold some stock). The code allows balancing allocations to even things out. So let’s say the stock was sold, the code would allow an allocation of gain on the sale of stock to one partner, then a greater allocation of loss to another partner. This gives some much-needed allocation “breathing room” to avoid the ceiling rule.

      If there are no other items you can also use a remedial method, these are artificial allocations. They have to balance, and they can’t exceed the amount needed to avoid the ceiling rule, but they allow “imaginary” gain and “imaginary” loss allocations as needed to avoid the ceiling rule.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.

Federal Indian Law – Federal Regulation

Posted on by
Reply

      When considering Federal Regulation of tribes, the question is never if the Federal Government has the power. The status of tribes as “domestic dependent nations” foreclosed that argument long ago. The question is the status of the tribes under Federal Regulation and some explanation is warranted.

      When the Federal Government regulates the states through legislation, much of the responsibility for enforcing the regulation is borne by the states. The states can make quality standards, issue permits etc., and the question becomes: what can the tribes do.

      Take the Clean Air Act. The states bear the burden of regulating under this act. The tribes can regulate under this act if they so choose. They are not subjected to the regulations burdening states and they are not subject to lawsuits by citizens. These protections come at a price: the land being regulated must be undisputedly under the control of the tribe. The tribe can therefore take as much of the burden as it is able and refuse the rest, trusting the Federal Government to fill the gaps.

      The Clean Water Act is another good example.  The tribes are treated as states if they have a government, reservation land, and the capability of carrying regulations. Once the requirements are satisfied the tribe can: receive grants for pollution control, set water quality standards, receive grants for treatment works, enforce quality standards, administer clean lake programs, and certify pollutant permits, issue permits, and issue permits for discharge.

      Now all these regulations are subject to the Montana exceptions (especially on fee land). Yet environmental regulation has consistently been upheld on the basis that it impacts the health & welfare of the tribe.

      Some environmental acts (like the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act) are not delegated to the tribes. Yet for the most part the tribes occupy a grey area of delegation. This regulation is limited by reservation boundaries, and this obstacle has not yet been overcome. Yet the tribes continue to seek ways to expand their regulation in the interest of protecting the environment.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.

Federal Indian Law – State Regulation

Posted on by
Reply

      Over the years the grey areas of jurisdiction have faded considerably. As a result, the remaining areas have been fiercely litigated and battles between state and tribe have erupted continually. In the next two segments we turn to the tax battle between tribes and states.

      A tribe has power to tax its members on reservation; this power is denied to the states. Additionally, the tribes can tax non-members who conduct business on lease land. Merrion v. Jicarilla. While this originally was an expansive holding, it has been limited. The tribe cannot tax non-member fee land unless the Montana exceptions apply. Atkinson Trading Co. The state power to tax is likewise limited. If a tribal member lives off the reservation he/she is subject to state taxation. If he/she resides on the reservation, the tax will not be allowed.

      Now these are semi-bright line rules. Yet there are still gaps and the state and tribes can enjoy concurrent taxing power in certain situations. The most common are state cigarette taxes.

      To knock out a state exercise of taxing power, the tribes must argue Federal Pre-Emption. It used to be that tribal sovereignty was pre-existent to the state power, this has changed. The emerging rule is that tribal sovereignty is created by the Federal Government. This sovereignty “pre-empts” state power. The next waves of litigation were predictably: when is there pre-emption.

      Pre-emption does not exist when the only motivation for litigation is tax evasion. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Coleville Reservation. In Washington, a state cigarette tax was upheld on the grounds that the tribe’s only motivation in fighting it was an economic advantage.  The state had the power to impose the tax, and seize goods when the tribe refused to comply.

      The tribes enjoy a limited sovereign immunity from state lawsuit. If the states sue to collect taxes, the tribes can occasionally escape. However, this sovereignty is also rather limited. The current judicial model is comprised of two parts.

      Cigarette tax and regulation is subject to a “minimal burden,” rule. The court decides if the regulation amounts to anything more than a “minimal burden.” The rest of regulation is permissible over non-members unless the transaction deals with the tribe. If the transaction deals with the tribe directly, then there is a balancing test between tribe and state interests.

      Turning to another kind of taxation, the states traditionally have the power to tax when minerals are removed from land. The question becomes: under what circumstances may they do so on reservations?

      These taxes appear to be allowed against non-members. The Court applies the Bracken test (state v. tribal interests). Additionally, the state may tax property held by members in fee. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation. This taxation is allowed on any land that is alienable.

      Even with strong tribal sovereignty arguments, the states still exercise considerable power. Yet the situation is not always bleak, and as tribal governments grow in power there is increasing cooperation. More and more agreements to hammer out jurisdictional points are being drafted, and the tribes are getting more and more of a fighting chance.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.

Federal Indian Law – Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Pt. 2

Posted on by
Reply

      As you get further and further into the quagmire of state v. tribal sovereignty the lines are far less bright. What follows is a general description and with any general description there will be exceptions and gaps.

      The next big challenge to tribal sovereignty came in the case of Nevada v. Hicks. This case was litigated by my professor for Federal Indian Law. In Nevada v. Hicks a lawsuit was lodged against law enforcement officers employed by the state. Originally, the lawsuit encompassed several entities of state and tribe, but by the time it reached the Supreme Court only the law enforcement personnel were still being sued.

      The Supreme Court shot down jurisdiction stating that regulation of state officials was not necessary to protect tribal sovereignty, even though all the actions took place on reservation land owned by members.

      Likewise, the Court ruled that the difference between suing individual state officials or state organizations had no effect. They decided this on practicality grounds. Finally, tribal courts took a sovereignty hit. Tribal Courts had power recognized equal to the power of their legislative bodies. Unlike state or federal courts, tribal courts could not raise questions of federal law. Their subject matter was limited to tribal matters.

      After Nevada v. Hicks was decided the dances continued in the lower circuit courts. Some courts limited Nevada v. Hicks, some expanded Nevada v. Hicks. For the most part, the wave tended to crest against sovereignty over state officials and actions.

      The next big case was Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Laden Cattle. Here a family was claiming predatory loans and discrimination against a bank. Despite the long history of filing in tribal court, the Supreme Court decided that there could be no regulation of business practices or the alienation of land.

      This rule was built upon in later years until Montana’s first exception, the consent rule, meant that: not only was consent required, but the litigation must arise specifically from matters attached to that consent.

      The result is another bleak chapter of Indian civil authority and a new rule. Tribal sovereignty would now derive from a tribe’s ability to exclude from land, rather than inherent nation power.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.

Partnership Tax – Nonrecourse Allocations

Posted on by
Reply

      In my last post we studied how a partnership might allocate gain/loss/deficit/debt in other ways than strict capital account values. I explained how allocations can stand if they satisfy the big three and substantial economic effect tests. A new can of worms is opened when study turns to nonrecourse allocations.

      When a debt is nonrecourse, it means it can only go as far as the property. Consequently, if a property owned by a partnership is foreclosed on, the creditor can’t go any further than the property itself. Under regulation 1.704-2, this little quirk means that allocations of nonrecourse proceeds are always without economic effect.

      Now that presents a problem; many partnerships use nonrecourse loans and want to allocate them in other ways besides capital accounts. Fortunately the regulations provide a way to do that. Before we can get into the method, some definitions must be explained.

  • Partnership Minimum Gain: If the property secured by a nonrecourse loan was foreclosed, the Partnership Minimum Gain is the amount of discharged liability over the adjusted basis. You see this most often when property secured by nonrecourse loan is depreciated.
  • Non-Recourse Deductions: Any deduction that increases Partnership Minimum Gain. (Ie. Depreciation deductions on secured property).
  • Minimum Gain Chargeback: Allocations of future gain, should the property be disposed through foreclosure. (IE. If the Partnership minimum gain is 5k, you might be slated to receive 3k of that if the property is foreclosed.). If the PMG goes down, gain is recognized by the partners.

      A partner’s share of the partnership minimum gain can be found by taking: the total amount of nonrecourse deductions allocated over the partnership’s life, plus any distributions of nonrecourse income, minus any net decreases of the PMG over the partnership’s life.

      Now, with the definitions above, the allocations of nonrecourse proceeds will stand if:

  • The capital accounts are maintained properly under regulation 1.704.
  • The allocations are consistent with the rest of proper allocations (if other allocations are 90-10, then these allocations must be 90-10 as well.
  • When the allocations begin, there is a Minimum Gain Chargeback provision.
  • All other allocations have been done properly.

      Like most other tax problems, if this test is failed then Capital Accounts control. Most people don’t want that, so draft the agreements carefully. A few side notes on nonrecourse allocations:

  • If nonrecourse proceeds are distributed (you take a 20k NR loan and distribute the money), you don’t have to recognize gain above your repayment obligations. You can allocate PMG to let your basis sink below zero.
  • If property is contributed to pay a NR loan, no gain must be allocated. The Capital Accounts will be increased to track the difference.
  • If NR debt is converted into Recourse debt, there need be no MGC as long as the liabilities are distributed.

      All in all this is a relatively simple chunk of tax law. As in every other section, one thing cannot be clearer: proper drafting is essential. Many of the requirement are mechanical, and with diligent work they can be satisfied.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.

Federal Indian Law – Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Pt. 1

Posted on by
Reply

      Last time I painstakingly expounded on the limits of tribal criminal jurisdiction. There is another kind of jurisdiction, and the story is much less bleak: civil jurisdiction. Now, my civil procedure class was long done before I started writing, but some foundation will be sprinkled throughout.

      Civil jurisdiction is regulatory jurisdiction (what people can and can’t do in a non-criminal context: licensing, pollution, etc.) and adjudicative jurisdiction (tort claims, injury, breach of contract etc.). There are two and a half factors in determining jurisdiction: the nationality of parties, the land status, and to a lesser degree if the contact is within the reservation.

      In Montana v. U.S. the Supreme Court set the foundational limitations of tribal civil jurisdiction. The tribe could regulate on land over which it exercised “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.” (Trust and lease land). It also exercised jurisdiction over non-Indian fee land to protect: political integrity, economic security, and health & welfare. As an aside, that second prong has been rendered virtually toothless.

      When the question is jurisdictional, it can be stated another way as: does the court have power. There are a number of ways to get this jurisdiction, but the easiest is personal jurisdiction. Most states can get this if there is personal service (someone delivers you a letter summoning you to court). This gets a bit dicey between state and tribe.

      The big jurisdictional battle is between the state and the tribe. If the defendant is a tribal member, jurisdiction belongs to the tribal courts. It has been ruled at the lower levels that personal service is not enough on a reservation. There are other ways to get jurisdiction (called long-arming it in), but as a go-to rule the states don’t have power when the defendant is a tribal member.

      When the defendant is non-tribal but the alleged conduct happens on the reservation (specifically on lease or trust land within reservation boundaries), the tribal court still have jurisdiction. You have to litigate through the trial, appellate, and supreme court levels of tribal court before you can enter another court system. Even when you get there, the question will be the tribal courts power, not the merits of the case.

      To a limited degree, the Federal courts will occasionally look at the power of tribes and other factual issues, but this is uncommon. There are also a few exceptions to the requirement of tribal remedy exhaustion (the rule that you have to go through all levels of tribal courts first) they are:

  • Tribal Jurisdiction was used to harass.
  • Tribal Jurisdiction would violate other judicial prohibitions.
  • Tribal Jurisdiction is futile, because it can’t be challenged.
  • No Federal Grant authorizes the Tribal Power.

      Things seemed pretty well set until early this millennium when the case of Brendale came down from the Supreme Court. This was a bright-line cut into civil jurisdiction. The reservation boundary didn’t matter, only the land status. Non-member fee land was exempt from tribal jurisdiction. To be fair, this wasn’t the exact holding, the Montana exceptions still applied, but the factual situation would be extreme where jurisdiction would be granted.

      Civil jurisdiction took another hit in State v. A-1 Contractors. A strip of land was taken by the state for a highway. When an accident occurred, the Court ruled that the tribe had no jurisdiction, as the land was owned by the State. Now, the Court seemed to care that neither the victim or defendant were tribal-members, but it’s unclear if this was dispositive.

      On the whole, the story of civil jurisdiction is far less bleak, but its likewise far from rosy. The Court continues to use tribal affiliation as the predominant guide for jurisdiction.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.

Federal Indian Law – Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction

Posted on by
Reply

      In the last post I explained the continuing abrogation of tribal sovereignty by the states and Federal Government; there is another kind of abrogation: abrogation by the judicial system.

      After the Marshall trilogy renewed with a vengeance, several questions came to the Court regarding tribal sovereignty. It was clear the tribes could not enter into treaties or alienate their land, but what control they maintained over their reservations was still hazy.

      As the tribes created more and more sophisticated governments and judicial branches, law enforcement began to grow more effective. Eventually, you had tribal officers arresting non-Indians on the reservation. Now the power of criminal jurisdiction over non-members was never explicitly removed, but it was challenged all the same.

      In the case of Oliphant v. Suqamish Tribe, the Supreme Court delivered another blow to tribal sovereignty. The ruling was that tribes had no power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-members. They could not subject non-members to the Tribal Courts.

      Naturally, non-Indian crime increased after this ruling. Without Federal help to police the reservation, tribal law enforcement was crippled; there was worse to come. In the following case of Duro, this limit was extended to all non-member Indians as well. To have criminal jurisdiction, you had to be a tribal member.

      I don’t want to break into an editorial here, but it is an important point that protecting tribal members from outsiders is one of the reasons for having tribal courts in the first place. Duro seemed to be a nail in the coffin of tribal sovereignty, but the damage was halted by Congressional act extending jurisdiction over non-member Indians.

      At this point, if you’re wondering why one race is subject to tribal courts without any others, you’re wondering about the right things. The act was challenged on these grounds, among others, in United States v. Lara and upheld. The tribes retain criminal jurisdiction, but only over Indians.

      This is pretty much the setup for criminal jurisdiction to the present day.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.

Federal Indian Law – Abrogations of Tribal Sovereignty

Posted on by
Reply

      The recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty runs deep, yet the legal history has been subject to vast abrogation of tribal powers. Implicit in the doctrine of sovereignty is that the Federal Government can limit tribal power with complete impunity. The question then arises: when has the Federal Government done so. Since the presumption is in favor of Indian power, the abrogation must be explicit and there are three major examples.

      The first hit to tribal sovereignty came in a case called Oliphant v. Suqamish Tribe. The result in Oliphant was a judicial statement that the tribes no longer had criminal jurisdiction over non-members. This created vulnerability in tribal sovereignty that would later be capitalized on.

      The next big step was the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The ICCA was created to plug a jurisdictional gap. Oliphant created the potential for non-Indian offenders to escape punishment by fleeing to reservations. Since the tribes had no control, they would have committed a crime with impunity. The court’s response was to declare that every crime in this gap was under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. This didn’t change tribal sovereignty so much as solidify the Oliphant limitations.

      Tribal sovereignty suffered another blow with the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Here Congress took jurisdiction away from Indian tribes for more than twelve (initially seven) major crimes. The crimes under the jurisdiction of the Federal government are: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A (rape and related offenses), incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, an assault against and individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country. If you look at this list, something should sink in: there aren’t many crimes not covered. The tribes could prosecute small offense like damage to property etc. but their peacekeeping power was crippled.

      The final blow came with public law 280; first, an explanation. While the limitations above are Federal and universal, public law 280 is limited and the power is given to the states. The law remains important because it is a vestige of the termination era, and it is often used as a sign of congressional intent. Under public law 280 states were given regulatory power over Indian country. They were not given the power to tax, but their regulatory authority (pollution, zoning, etc.) would replace the tribes’. Not every state was required to apply this law. A few were required, a few opted in, a few opted in partially, and a few didn’t apply the P. Law at all. In application the law was a failure. The regulation had no way of being financed; the states were not allowed to tax the tribes. Furthermore, tribal power on the reservation was limited in such a way that law enforcement was majorly crimped. The state did not have the funds to protect the reservations, and the tribes could not protect the reservations themselves. As time has passed the presumption of P. Law 280 is to give sovereignty back to the tribes, and more and more states are opting out of it.

      For the aspiring lawyer, these are problems that need to be faced. There are strong congressional intent arguments opposed to tribal sovereignty. The problem is not insurmountable, but the vestigial effects of this legislation will be a roadblock for the self-determination of those tribes affected.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.

Federal Indian Law – Tribal Sovereignty Overview

Posted on by
Reply

The Indian Tribes of the United States are sovereign. That means there is a recognized right of rulership inside reservations. This isn’t an absolute rule, the tribes are beneath the Federal Government, but many tenets of sovereign rule remain.

To get specific, the tribes have sovereignty except where that sovereignty has been abrogated by Congress. The most sweeping abrogation is the removal of external powers. The tribes cannot make treaties or trade agreements with other nations. Over the years the internal powers of the tribes have been abrogated as well. The result is a diminished sovereignty, with the tribes retaining important powers, albeit
a few of them. Since congress legislates to individual tribes, in many cases, the specifics cannot only be gleaned by a study of an individual tribe.

The most complicated question is jurisdiction in court matters. Congress took the authority to litigate ten major crimes (murder, manslaughter, rape, arson, etc.) even if they occur between Indians on the reservation. The tribes can still litigate these issues at a lower level.

Before even jumping into the sovereignty question, there are several foundational points that must be addressed. First: is the land Indian Country?

If the land is not Indian Country, there can be no sovereignty, but what is Indian Country. Like in many law inquiries, the answer begins with a statute and ends with the courts. U.S.C. § 1151 define Indian Country as:

  • All land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the
    issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through thereservation.
  • All dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United State whether within the original or subsequently acquire
    territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
  • All Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
    same.

The statute has been abrogated in favor of judicial decision, so while it is useful as a beginning point, it is only that: a beginning point. The first big change came in Seymour v. Superintendent. In this case the Court ruled that fee land, owned by non-Indians but within the reservation, still counted as Indian Country. This elevated the boundaries of the reservation over ownership status, and removed a cramp on law-enforcement activities.

Prior to this decision, checkerboard reservations (with portions owned by Indians and non-Indians) created a jurisdictional nightmare for tribal law enforcement, who could only work on reservation land.

The next big change came in Solem v. Bartlett. A man was arrested for rape on the reservation and judged guilty. He appealed to the Federal Courts and said that since the reservation was opened to white development, he had not been in Indian Country. The court responded by creating a distinction: diminished reservations and disestablished reservations.

A diminished reservation retains its sovereign powers on the lands that remain; a disestablished reservation has its sovereignty removed. The Court decided that the reservation wasn’t even diminished in this case and allowed the conviction to stand.

The final chunk of decisions concerned land “set apart for Indians.” If you don’t know how the legal system works. Lawyers find ambiguity and litigate it until it’s no longer ambiguity (hopefully no longer ambiguity in their favor). As reservations became more solidified, litigation turned to the question of land set apart for Indians. Since this was Indian Country, the implications were rather pressing. The Court released a factor test to decide:

  • Has the United States retained “title to the lands which it permits the Indians to occupy,” and “authority to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this territory?”
  • “The nature of the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and toward the federal government, and the established practice of government agencies toward the area.”
  • If there is an “element of  cohesiveness…manifested either be economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by that locality, and
  • If such lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples.”

Like all Court decisions, these are weighed on a case by case basis. Some other little tidbits help to round out the picture. If lands are put back into the public domain, the Court will infer diminishment rather than disestablishment.

All of these set the foundation for further inquiry. From solid ground the lawyer plods into a swamp of specifics hoping his client will prevail. Case in point: Calcieri v. Salazar. The question is if tribes created after the termination period (1934) are immune from state jurisdiction. The answer is a nebulous “yes, maybe, no.” Only practice and patience will give exact answers.

Disclaimer: Law Summaries are created by a non-barred individual. These summaries are not meant to replace genuine legal advice and expertise.